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I. INTRODUCTION
The federal Constitution protects individual rights against invasions
by government,' or invasions that involve what has been called "state
action."2 It is therefore not surprising that the state action doctrine has
been referred to as "the most important problem in American law."3
Unfortunately, the importance of the state action doctrine has not been
matched by its clarity. Despite the doctrine's long history,4 and recur-
ring litigation concerning the doctrine, the strong academic consensus is
that the state action doctrine has been,5 and remains, a conceptual disas-
ter area.' The doctrine nevertheless remains firmly entrenched in the
case law.7 A sound, coherent theory of what constitutes "state action"
would therefore be of great value.
The phrase "state action" does not appear in the Constitution. Focus-
* Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University.
1. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18-1, at 1688 (2d ed. 1988) (dis-
cussing the limited scope of most constitutional protection).
2. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002-03 (1982).
3. Black, Foreword: "State Action, "Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81
HARV. L. REV. 69, 69 (1967).
4. The state action requirement under the fourteenth amendment is ordinarily traced to
the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1002. See generally, Nerken,
A New Deal for The Protection of Fourteenth Amendment Rights: Challenging the Doctrinal
Bases of the Civil Rights Cases and State Action Theory, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297
(1977); Schneider, State Action-Making Sense Out Of Chaos-An Historical Approach, 37 U.
FLA. L. REV. 737 (1985).
5. Black, supra note 3, at 95.
6. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 1690 (employing the language quoted in text);
Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 503, 504 (1985); Choper, Thoughts
on State Action: The "Government Function" and "Power Theory" Approaches, 1979 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 757, 757; Friendly, The Public-Private Penumbra-Fourteen Years Later, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 1289, 1290 (1982); Phillips, The Inevitable Incoherence of Modern State Action Doc-
trine, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 683, 683 (1984); Rowe, The Emerging Threshold Approach to State
Action Determinations: Trying to Make Sense of Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 69 GEO. L.J.
745, 745 (1981); Schneider, The 1982 State Action Trilogy: Doctrinal Contraction, Confusion,
and a Proposal for Change, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1150, 1150 (1985).
7. See. e.g., Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 461 (1988) (reaf-
firming importance of state action requirement); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (satis-
fying fourteenth amendment state action requirement satisfies "under color of state law"
requirement for section 1983 purposes); Tulsa Prof. Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S.
478 (1988); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc., v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522 (1987). But cf Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 523. Professor Chemerinsky holds that a
majority of the Congress that enacted the fourteenth amendment "believed that a state denies
equal protection of the law and deprives rights if it tolerates private discrimination and in-
fringements." Id. Following such a view, the equal protection clause essentially targets all
persons, as opposed to government-related actors only, as the class of potential violators.
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ing too literally upon the general idea of "action" by the state may de-
part, in either an underinclusive or overinclusive way, from the
constitutional text. This Article suggests that if state action has been a
conceptual disaster area, this condition can be improved by a rigorous
application of common sense. The courts should find what is mislead-
ingly called "state action" when, and only when, the state can properly
be said to bear responsibility, of the right kind and degree, for the under-
lying act, condition, or event complained of by the plaintiff. To greatly
oversimplify, there is state action where there is state responsibility.
The novelty of this approach does not lie in the mere reference to the
idea of governmental responsibility. The cases refer to the idea of re-
sponsibility with some frequency,8 as do some commentators.' While it
has occasionally been explicitly denied that state responsibility is central
to "state action," 0 the cases and the academic literature more often sim-
ply refer to the idea of state responsibility generally without developing
the idea at all. It should not be surprising, therefore, that the inquiry
remains a conceptual disaster area.
In view of the consensus that the state action theory is a disaster, it is
surprising that neither cases nor commentators have attempted to clarify
the idea of governments being responsible, in the proper sense, for a state
of affairs such that relevant constitutional protections attach." What
makes this doubly surprising, particularly with regard to academic com-
mentators, is that there is a large body of philosophical literature not
merely on action theory generally, but focusing on one or more senses of
the concept of responsibility. 2 Much of this literature applies to ques-
8. See, e-g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483
U.S. 522, 544 (1987) (responsibility as relevant to state action); Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004; Lugar
v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840
(1982); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345, 360 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
9. See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 1689; Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes For a Revised
Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 481 (1962).
10. See Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Ac-
tivity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656, 677 (1974) (rejecting responsibility-based approach to state
action analysis).
11. It may be that on some approaches a government might be responsible to some extent
for an occurrence, yet not sufficiently responsible so as to trigger relevant constitutional guar-
antees. This Article has no quarrel with such approaches.
12. See generally E. BODENHEIMER, PHILOSOPHY OF RESPONSIBILrTY (1980); J. FEIN-
BERG, DOING AND DESERVING (1970); J. GLOVER, CAUSING DEATH AND SAVING LIVES
(1977); J. GLOVER, RESPONSIBILITY (1970); H. HART & T. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE
LAW ch. 3 (2d ed. 1985); 28 TULANE STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY: STUDIES IN ACTION THEORY
(R. Whittemore ed. 1979); Baldwin, Foresight and Responsibility, 54 PHIL. Q. 347 (1979); Flo-
res & Johnson, Collective Responsibility and Professional Roles, 93 ETHICS 537 (1983); Goodin,
Apportioning Responsibilities, 6 L. & PHIL. 167 (1987); Goodin, Responsibilities, 36 PHIL. Q. 50
(1986); Haines, Responsibility and Accountability, 30 PHIL. Q. 141 (1955); Hart, Varieties of
Responsibility, 83 L.Q. REV. 346 (1967); Haydon, On Being Responsible, 28 PHIL. Q. 46
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tions of the responsibility of abstractions or collectivities such as the
state, and some of the literature is authored by persons with a particular
interest in legal philosophy. 3 Yet it can fairly be said that those con-
cerned with state action, or state responsibility, have essentially ignored
this obviously relevant literature.
What accounts for the universal failure to draw upon this rich philo-
sophical literature in order to ameliorate the conceptual "disaster" is not
clear. One can possibly argue that while the fourteenth amendment, for
example, does not speak of state action or inaction, neither does it speak
of state responsibility; instead it speaks in terms of making and enforcing,
depriving, and denying. 4 The cases, however, and some of the academic
commentary, have adopted the concept of state responsibility.' 5 This Ar-
ticle will illustrate why it is sensible to adopt this concept. Of course, the
analysis of responsibility in any controversial setting will involve "many
serious problems."' 6 There is no reason to believe, however, that pro-
gress cannot be made by drawing upon the insights available in the rele-
vant philosophical literature. If the alternative is merely continuing
conceptual disaster, there seems little to lose in the attempt.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
Even a brief examination of state action case law reveals a profusion of
controversial tests and considerations of uncertain scope. A recent
Supreme Court case provides the following general starting point:
In the typical case raising a state action issue, a private party has taken
the decisive step that caused the harm to the plaintiff, and the question
is whether the State was sufficiently involved to treat that decisive con-
duct as state action. This may occur if the State creates the legal frame-
(1978); Honore, Responsibility and Luck, 104 L.Q. RE,. 530 (1988); Husak, Omissions, Causa-
tion and Liability, 30 PHIL. Q. 318 (1980); Kagan, Causation and Responsibility, 25 AM. PHIL.
Q. 293 (1988); Mellema, On Being Fully Responsible, 21 AM. PHIL. Q. 189 (1984); Miller,
Foresight, Intention and Responsibility, 27 S.J. PHIL. 71 (1989); Pitcher, Hart on Action and
Responsibility, 69 PHIL. REv. 226 (1960); Sober, Apportioning Causal Responsibility, 85 J.
PHIL. 303 (1988); Thompson, Ascribing Responsibility to Advisers in Government, 93 ETHics
546 (1983); Walsh, Pride, Shame and Responsibility, 28 PHIL. Q. 1 (1978); Weinryb, Omissions
and Responsibility, 30 PHIL. Q. 1 (1980); Zimmerman, Negligence and Moral Responsibility, 20
Nous 199 (1986); Zimmerman, Sharing Responsibility, 22 AM. PHIL. Q. 115 (1985).
13. See generally, supra note 12 (materials authored by writers such as H.L.A. Hart, Tony
Honore, and Joel Feinberg).
14. Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Ac-
tion" Requirement, 1976 Sup. Cr. REV. 221, 228 (P. Kurland ed. 1977) (noting fourteenth
amendment's literal focus on the state's depriving or denying, rather than acting).
15. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (collecting authorities). The concept of
attributing responsibility to an organization or other abstract or collective entity, such as a
government, seems well-established. See, Walsh, supra note 12, at 8 ("the acts and decisions of
a nation").
16. Weinryb, supra note 12, at 1.
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work governing the conduct, . . . if it delegates its authority to the
private actor.... or sometimes if it knowingly accepts the benefits de-
rived from unconstitutional behavior .... Thus, in the usual case we
ask whether the State provided a mantle of authority that enhanced the
power of the harm-causing individual actor. 7
The Court cites as an example of this process the inquiry into "whether
there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged
... action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter ... may
fairly be treated as that of the State itself."18
Each of these particular inquiries is subject to controversial exceptions
of uncertain breadth. From a perspective that focuses instead on state
responsibility, each of these inquiries is problematic. Without yet having
explored the concept of responsibility, it nonetheless seems clear that the
above formulations create as many problems as they resolve. For exam-
ple, the "nexus" test, drawn from Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Com-
pany, 1 9 asks whether the private defendant's action "may fairly be
treated as that of the State itself."'2 In its most literal sense, this test is
too stringent. Often, we hold persons responsible for merely aiding and
abetting, for making some event possible, or for endorsing or approving
an act they did not perform.21 The state would, in such cases, share
responsibility for an action, event, or its consequences, 22 without the
state itself being deemed to have undertaken that action.23 If the lan-
guage in Jackson is to be read more broadly, the analysis of responsibility
below may help to clarify its legitimate and defensible bounds.
The language quoted from Jackson is not without value. In some re-
spects, it usefully qualifies other formulations of the state action inquiry.
For example, it may in some cases be too restrictive to focus on "whether
the State provided a mantle of authority that enhanced the power of the
harm-causing individual actor.",24 The state may, for example, explicitly
approve of an action only after it takes place, without assisting the pri-
17. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 462 (1988).
18. Id at 462 n.12 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351
(1974)).
19. 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
20. Id.; see Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978).
21. It seems clear that we sometimes hold persons responsible, because of what they did or
failed to do, with respect to the acts of another.
22. The concept of shared or partial responsibility seems well established. See, Miller,
supra note 12, at 83. This issue is further discussed, infra, in text of Section IV.
23. But note the possible moral distinction between the state itself actually making a deci-
sion and the state's merely enforcing the decision of another. See, Van Alstyne, Mr. Justice
Black Constitutional Review, and the Talisman of State Action, 1965 DUKE UNIv. L.J. 219,
223.
24. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 462 (1988).
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vate actor at the time of or before the action in question. 25 The state has,
therefore, clearly not "enhanced the power of" the actor, at least until
the relevant act was completed. No state action would be present, there-
fore, on the power-enhancement test.
If the state's later ratification of the private act is clear, strong, une-
quivocal, and consciously considered, however, perhaps the state then
has come to share responsibility for the prior act with the private actor,
or at least it becomes reasonable to think of the state as though it were
partly responsible for the otherwise private act. 26 One way of formulat-
ing this idea would be through the Jackson "nexus" inquiry into whether
the initially private action may fairly be considered as that of the state.
If the state at any point sufficiently identifies itself with the challenged
private action, the state may be said to have assumed some measure of
responsibility for that action.
Similar tests have been applied to cases in which the government as-
sisted, encouraged, controlled, or merely was involved with the private
party, in some way directly or indirectly related to the particular chal-
lenged private activity. One broad formulation expounds that "when pri-
vate parties make use of state procedures with the overt, significant
assistance of state officials, state action may be found."128 Even this rela-
tively liberal formulation would require that the state assistance be"overt" before it could rise to the level of state action. Focusing instead
on state responsibility would suggest that covert state assistance as well
may suffice. The overt or covert nature of the state assistance may still
feed into the question of state action in cases in which public perception
of the state's role in assisting the private actor becomes relevant.29 If the
public sees no connection between the state and the private action, the
plaintiff can hardly claim that the state has endorsed the private action.
In contrast, the Court has also held that a state "normally can be held
25. The possibility of shared responsibility between or among persons who act at different
times is also recognized in the literature. See, Zimmerman, Sharing Responsibility, 22 AM.
PHIL. Q. 115, 116 (1985).
26. Consider the language in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725
(1961), where the Court discussed the possibility of a state abdicating its responsibilities by
failing to censure racial discrimination under particular circumstances. See Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 895 F.2d 218 (1990).
27. These apparently casual references to private as opposed to public actions, as though
the distinction between public and private were invariably luminously clear, are made only to
avoid premature complications. This article discusses the obviously problematic character of
the public/private distinction at various points below, particularly in the text of Section IV.
28. Tulsa Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988) (citing, inter alia, Lugar
v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982)).
29. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (considering public
perception of state's role in apparently sanctioning racial discrimination by putatively private
actor).
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responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive
power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or
covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the [govern-
ment]."3 While this formulation rightly reintroduces the possibility of
covert state action, in other respects it seems far too restrictive on a rea-
sonably literal interpretation. No reason exists to assume that a state can
never share responsibility for private choice, even in some cases in which
the state's assistance to the private actor was unnecessary, or was caus-
ally insignificant. This might occur where the private actor would have
made the same choice without the state's encouragement. In such a case,
the actual choice is clearly that of the private actor rather than that of
the government. The government may on such occasions, however, ap-
prove of the private action, before or after the occurrence of that private
action, and state responsibility may attach.
Admittedly, the Court has said on several occasions that "mere ap-
proval" by the state of a private actor's choice cannot rise to the level of
state action. 31 This statement is probably misleading at best. The prob-
lem arises in ordinary contexts because one person's mere approval of the
acts of another, depending upon the circumstances, may indeed suffice to
incur responsibility. A private business person's signature on a docu-
ment prepared by another person in a context manifesting approval is
one example. The signature here may suffice to make the signer responsi-
ble for the contents of the document or their consequences, without the
actual signature having encouraged, significantly or otherwise, the actual
preparer of the document.
Another problem lurking in the case law is whether state action re-
quires a strong linkage between the government's involvement and the
specific private action complained of, or whether the government's mere
general involvement with the private actor can be so pervasive, intimate,
thorough, and substantial that a specific linkage to the particular private
action being challenged is unnecessary for state action to exist. Some
Justices appear to accept the latter possibility. For example, in a recent
case, the Court held that the state's involvement in the challenged private
action was so "substantial and pervasive" and intimate in so many signif-
icant respects, as opposed to being merely "limited" state involvement,
that state action must be found. 32 Following such an approach, "where
30. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522,
546 (1987) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
31. Id. (quoting Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004-05); see Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,
164 (1978) (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1954); Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)); Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1316 (Gee, J., dissenting), aff'd,
895 F.2d 218 (1990).
32. Pope, 485 U.S. at 487.
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the State has so thoroughly insinuated itself into the operations of the
[private] enterprise, it should not be fatal if the State has not affirmatively
sanctioned the particular [challenged] practice in question."3 At the ex-
treme, even the state's "creation of a favorable milieu"3 4 for the chal-
lenged private action, without a more specific, concrete linkage, may
suffice for state action.
In contrast, a number of state action cases require the showing of a
sufficient, direct linkage between the state and the particular challenged
action or decision by the private party.35 Even pervasive, generally de-
tailed state regulation of the private actor may not suffice for state ac-
tion.36 Following such a view, if the specific challenged private action
was actually independent of the regulation, state action is not present.37
Such a view might even call into question the presence of state action in
the classic constitutional law case of New York Times v. Sullivan,38 in
which the libel plaintiff merely took advantage of the general availability
of uniform, broad rules of Alabama state libel law.39
Focusing on the concept of responsibility in this context cannot make
unavoidably close cases easy; however, it may help to remove obstacles to
proper analysis. The more restrictive cases are clearly correct in holding
that responsibility requires some sufficient connection to the particular
act or event in question. If no such specific nexus is required, ascriptions
of responsibility become arbitrary. The less restrictive cases are also val-
uable in implying that responsibility may be assigned on the basis of an
indirect, multi-linked, vague, and even speculative or probabilistic con-
nection to the particular challenged act. When we ascribe partial respon-
sibility to a parent for a child's act of rudeness, we presume some sort of
connection between the parent and the particular act of rudeness in ques-
tion; however, we may have in mind only a vague, speculative, largely
unknown general course of parental conduct or omission as constituting
or creating that connection. Nevertheless, our ascription of responsibil-
ity to the parent may be justified. For an example based on the state
action cases, consider a simplified version of Burton v. Wilmington Park-
33. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 370 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457
U.S. 830, 844-46 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (urging a relatively broad approach to state
action in this regard).
34. Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection,
1967 Sup. CT. REv. 39, 53 (P. Kurland ed. 1968) (discussing Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967)).
35. See Kohn, 457 U.S. at 841 (requiring a relatively concrete, affirmative relationship);
Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358-59.
36. See, e.g., Blum, 457 U.S. at 1007-10; Kohn, 457 U.S. at 841; Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358-
59.
37. See Phillips, supra note 6, at 715.
38. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
39. See Van Alstyne, supra note 23, at 228-29.
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ing Authority.' We shall assume that the state does not approve of or
encourage racial discrimination by private parties, but it accepts other-
wise unavailable tax money generated by such private racial discrimina-
tion. A specific linkage between the state and the private discrimination
exists, but it is attenuated. We may nevertheless suggest that the govern-
ment's acceptance of, and benefit from, the "blood money" of racial dis-
crimination suffices to taint or implicate the state in some measure of
responsibility for the private discriminatory conduct.
A final general test for state action encountered in the case law pro-
vides that courts may find state action where the "private" actor per-
formed the challenged act while engaging in some function that has
traditionally been reserved exclusively to the state or federal govern-
ment." This test has its roots in the well-known privately owned "com-
pany town" case of Marsh v. Alabama,42 in which the Court held that the
company town was a state actor by restricting the distribution of litera-
ture. Critics of this formulation have questioned whether the function
must be one reserved exclusively to the government,43 as well as whether
the function involved must have been "traditionally" reserved to the
government."
Focusing instead on the idea of responsibility allows us to understand
both the logic and the limitations of the public function approach to state
action. If a "private" actor has been designated as the authorized agent
of the state in the relevant respects, the state may retain some responsi-
bility for the acts of that private party. On the other hand, if the state
delegates away certain of its enterprises, as through privatization, it may,
depending on the circumstances, properly divest itself of responsibility.
Public function doctrine is of little assistance in this regard. The crucial
inquiry may be whether the state has, through the device of delegation,
sought to insulate itself, circumvent constitutional requirements, or
evade responsibility.
Let us suppose that the record clearly establishes that the state has
privatized a certain activity with the sole aim of facilitating racial dis-
crimination in the conduct of that activity. The state would generally be
40. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
41. See, e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483
U.S. 522, 544 (1987);Blum, 457 U.S. at lOll;Kohn, 457 U.S. at 842; Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352.
42. 326 U.S. 501 (1946); see Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
43. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 549 & n.1 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
44. Professor Tribe has pointed out that the Court has found the distinction between tradi-
tional and non-traditional governmental functions to be unworkable and unsound in another
context. See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 1706 n.4 (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 543-46 (1985)). But see Schneider, supra note 6, at 1168 (approving of
traditional/non-traditional function distinction in state action context).
[Vol. XXIII:685
STATE ACTION AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY
at least partially responsible for the private discrimination, even if the
state had genuinely and completely abandoned all control over the con-
duct of the now private function.45 It is worth noting that this analysis
would likely be the same whether or not the function was one tradition-
ally reserved to the state.46
The mere fact of government delegation or privatization of even a tra-
ditionally exclusive government function, therefore, cannot tell us
whether the state retains responsibility in the area delegated. While
privatization cannot automatically work a release of government respon-
sibility,47 neither is it necessarily ineffectual or inherently suspect.4
When the state can show that in good faith and for coherent reason it
delegated an activity to a private actor without retaining the right to con-
trol the private actor in the respects relevant to the challenged action, the
state should generally be absolved from responsibility for that action.
This is particularly true where the state did not specifically foresee the
challenged private action at the time of delegation. With due allowances
for the state's sovereign and public character, this result would roughly
follow the logic of the law of responsibility for the acts of an independent
contractor.49 State action would therefore not attach.
An initial excursion through some of the most prominent tests for state
action, even without a detailed examination of the philosophical litera-
ture on responsibility, reveals a great deal of confused and dubious law.
The Court has even admitted its own uncertainty as to whether its vari-
ous apparently different tests are different in operation, or whether they
all simply aim at generally sifting the often subtle individual fact situa-
tions presented in the cases.5 ° The thesis introduced above suggests that
focusing on the idea of state responsibility can reduce the doctrinal con-
fusion, and some progress in clarifying the idea of state action has al-
ready been made.
45. Note the Court's pragmatic analysis and the analysis in terms of "circumvention" in
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953).
46. But see Schneider, supra note 6, at 1168 (considering whether the function in question
is one traditionally reserved to the state).
47. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 560 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. But see, Kohn, 457 U.S. at 849 & n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (state action still at-
taches after good faith delegation of state authority if "constitutional values" still threatened);
Milo v. Cushing Mun. Hosp., 861 F.2d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir. 1988) (lease to or contracting for
management with private entity does not allow state to "escape liability" even in absence of
suspicious motives underlying delegation).
49. See Schneider, supra note 6, at 1169 (analogy to tort liability for acts of an independent
contractor). Of course, the point of claiming state action is not to help build a case for the
state's legal liability, or the state's answerability in damages. Showing the state's "responsibil-
ity" merely allows the suit against "private" actors to proceed to the merits on the relevant
constitutionally-based theory.
50. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982).
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We are in a position to be skeptical of the consensus view that the
concept of state action is inherently, irredeemably confused,5 or that
state action is a useless concept because state action actually exists in any
litigated case.52 This is because no one has claimed that the idea of re-
sponsibility, or state responsibility, is itself irredeemably confused. Pro-
gress can be made on delimiting the scope of state responsibility. As we
shall explore further below, for example, it is a mistake to think of a
sovereign state as responsible for all private conduct resembling a consti-
tutional violation. There are no sound conceptual grounds for doing so,
and such a view is not required by a consistent concern for the variety of
serious threats to constitutional values posed by private actors.
III. STATE ACTION, STATE RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE DEFENSE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES
The temptation to simply slice through the complexity, by abolishing
the state action doctrine, is strong in an era of an activist, post-New Deal
state. Following such a view, the government would be deemed responsi-
ble for every private act that would be a constitutional violation if per-
formed by the government itself. As we shall see, however, even activist
states assume a limited scope of responsibility, and have sound reasons
for retaining a state action doctrine in some form.
A number of justifications have been offered for the state action doc-
trine beyond the fact that the relevant constitutional provisions plainly
require some type of state action doctrine. One writer has cited "re-
straining government power, acknowledging the role of government as
exemplar, maintaining the separation of powers, and strengthening feder-
alism as underlying the state action doctrine."53 It is often suggested,
somewhat circularly, that a further aim of the state action doctrine
51. See, e.g., Horowitz, The Misleading Search For "State Action" Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208 (1957) (maintaining that the state action doctrine is
inherently confused); Phillips, The Inevitable Incoherence of Modern State Action Doctrine, 28
ST. Louis U.L.J. 683 (1984); Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEX. L. REV. 347
(1963); see generally Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982).
52. See, e.g., Black, supra note 3, at 70; Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 522; Heins, "The
Marketplace and the World of Ideas'" A Substitute For State Action as a Limiting Principle
Under the Massachusetts Equal Rights Amendment, 18 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 347, 349 (1984);
Horowitz, supra note 51, at 208-09; Nerken, supra note 4, at 298 ("state action ... is always
there"); Tushnet, Shelley v. Kraemer and Theories of Equality, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 383,
385 (1988) (referring to "the conventional observation that judicial action in enforcing com-
mon law rules unproblematically constitutes state action"); Van Alstyne, supra note 23, at 231;
Williams, supra note 51, at 367.
53. Jakosa, Parsing Public From Private: The Failure of Differential State Action Analysis,
19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 193, 232 (1984) (citing traditional justifications for state action
doctrine).
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should be the "satisfaction of public expectations."'" Along these lines,
Professor Black has suggested that while, in a sense, any substantial liti-
gated case with public policy implications will involve state action, the
equal protection clause should not apply to "the private life which people
really do, in general, expect to live privately .... " " Similarly, Professor
Sunstein has characterized the state action inquiry as one into whether
the state "has deviated from functions that are perceived as normal and
desirable." 6
One problem is that what the public expects or considers normal in
this area will depend in some measure on how the courts have decided
constitutional cases. Even with this partial circularity set aside, though,
a theory of state action is incomplete unless it can suggest why, substan-
tively, popular expectations are what they are, on grounds independent
of established constitutional doctrine. This Article suggests that depend-
ing upon a wide variety of factors discussed at length below, people either
do or do not deem the government responsible for particular acts or
omissions by private parties.
It is possible to object that all justifications of the state action doctrine
fail to appreciate the range of contemporary threats to the constitutional
values and individual liberties sought to be protected by the Constitution.
Simply put, scholars argue that private actors, even without any special
assistance from the government, "may limit personal rights as effectively
as the government."57 Through the concentration of wealth and power
in private, often corporate, hands," private sanctions can possibly chill
freedom of speech as much as public sanctions.5 9
Such an approach is not easily dismissed. It is clearly more difficult
for an employee of a private corporate monopoly, who has great invest-
ments in firm-specific job skills, to resign when facing a free-speech threat
from that employer than for a resident of one state to move to another
state to avoid a governmental free-speech threat. The drafters of the
state action requirement, however, may reasonably have believed that
governmental invasions of free-speech interests, for example, were likely
to be more frequent, or more severe, or less avoidable at relatively low
cost, than private corporate invasions, at least in a predominantly com-
petitive market economy.
54. Schneider, State Action-Making Sense Out of Chaos-An Historical Approach, 37 U.
FLA. L. REv. 737, 737 (1985); see Schneider, supra note 6, at 1155.
55. Black, supra note 3, at 101.
56. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 887 (1987).
57. Note, State Action: Theories For Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activ-
ity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656, 657 (1974).
58. See Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 510.
59. See Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 510; Phillips, supra note 6, at 727.
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Just as important, though, is the fact that being censored or being sub-
ject to discrimination by the state tends to be different from, and indeed
worse than, censorship or discrimination by a typical private actor. Per-
sons rejected on the basis of race by a private employer obviously receive
an injury deserving of some sort of effective legal redress. Persons re-
jected on the basis of race by their own government, however, receive a
peculiarly ultimate rejection, with formal, official endorsement by a body
authorized to speak for society as a whole.'
The defense of a state action doctrine must not be conducted in unduly
simplistic terms. The Courts quite often suggest that the state action
doctrine serves the cause of promoting individual liberty. The United
States Supreme Court in Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Company,6" for exam-
ple, maintains that the state action doctrine "preserves an area of individ-
ual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial
power." 62 The Court has repeated this language elsewhere,63 with the
general approval of a number of academic commentators." A variant of
this claim holds that the state action doctrine sacrifices equality in some
respects for the sake of individual liberty.65
Such a view requires elaboration at the very least. This view overlooks
the fact that the effects of the state action doctrine on individual liberty
are necessarily mixed and equivocal. As one commentator has pointed
out, "[n]o matter how a court decides, someone's liberty will be ex-
panded and someone's liberty restricted."" The case of Burton v. Wil-
mington Parking Authority67 provides a suitable example. The Court's
finding of state action inevitably reduced the defendant restaurant
owner's freedom of choice or freedom of association, just as it expanded
the range of restaurant choices or the freedom of personal choice of the
plaintiff, who had been subject to racially-based exclusion by the
restaurant. 68
Recognizing that any state action decision will have equivocal effects
on individual liberty does not mean that, with respect to individual lib-
erty, a court can make the decision in any state action case arbitrarily. In
Burton, the Court found state action, triggering the applicability of the
60. See Jakosa, supra note 53, at 224-25 (discussing special character and role of the state).
61. 457 U.S. 936 (1982).
62. Id.
63. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 461 (1988); see
Tushnet, supra note 52, at 398 (quoting the language at issue).
64. See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 18-2 at 1691 (reporting the standard view).
65. See Henkin, supra note 9, at 488; Schneider, supra note 6, at 1154.
66. Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 536.
67. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
68. See id. at 716.
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equal protection clause.69 The importance of individual liberty justifies
the result in that some restrictions on individual liberty are of a particu-
larly objectionable character, and should not be tolerated, even if that
loss of liberty makes possible a superficially parallel gain in individual
liberty for another person. In Burton, the combined restaurant and pub-
lic parking facility bore "official signs indicating the public character of
the building, and flew from mastheads on the roof both the state and
national flags."70 From this single element alone, setting aside any ele-
ment of subsidy, mutual benefit, or other grounds for finding state action
in the case, a logical defense of Burton can be built.7" Persons denied
restaurant service on racial grounds could reasonably have believed,
under the circumstances, that the public authority itself branded them as
inferior.
This sort of restriction on individual freedom is, as we have seen, qual-
itatively worse than the restriction involved in requiring non-discrimina-
tion on the part of the restaurant owner.72 While the latter restriction
reduces the owner's freedom and stands in some sense as an official repu-
diation, it presumably does not typically strike as profoundly humiliating
a blow as apparent state endorsement of one's essential general inferi-
ority. Even if the state did not itself inflict the latter sort of injury, or in
any fashion itself racially discriminate, the Burton Court rightly held the
state at least partially responsible for the injuries of which the plaintiffs
complained.
There is therefore some logic to the view that injuries for which the
state maintains at least partial responsibility tend to be in some sense"worse," thus helping to account for the existence of the state action
doctrine. One cannot deny, however, that some affronts, for which no
responsibility lies with the state, may rise to grievous proportions and
call for legal redress. The state action doctrine, however, does not oper-
ate to bar legal redress in such cases. Sources of redress against all signif-
icant instances of unfairness exist outside of the federal Constitution.
For remedies of injustices for which the state cannot be found responsi-
ble, persons may look to sources such as contract law,73 the common law
in general,74 state statutory or constitutional law,75 or the full panoply of
69. Id. at 725-26.
70. Id. at 720.
71. See id. at 724.
72. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing role of state and impact upon
rejection by state).
73. At least some private employment contracts specify the equivalent of a minimum level
of due process in employment termination. Where they do not, this exclusion may be part of a
voluntary tradeoff reflecting the interests of both the employer and the employee. See Epstein,
In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984).
74. The common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, for example, has
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federal statutory protections not dependent upon a showing of state ac-
tion. Chief among the latter would be the Civil Rights Act of 1964,76
which the courts have upheld on the basis of the commerce clause,
thereby bypassing any state action requirement." As a result, "state ac-
tion cases involving racial discrimination are infrequent today."7 "
In sum, it is at best a wild exaggeration to suppose that "courts are
powerless to halt private infringements of even the most basic constitu-
tional values."79 Instead, the state action doctrine is justifiable on the
ground that the advantages of not broadly extending federal constitu-
tional protection outweigh the net harms suffered in the often borderline
cases in which the interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, and the general
public are such that no law, state or federal, common or statutory, af-
fords the plaintiff relief.80
IV. THE CONCEPT OF RESPONSIBILITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
A. Is the Concept of Public Responsibility Viable?
Thus far, this Article has developed some grounds for doubting that
the concept of state action must necessarily remain a "conceptual disas-
been employed in cases of an employer's egregious and overt racial bigotry. See, eg., Alcorn v.
Anbro Eng'g. Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970) (en banc) (also involv-
ing arbitrary adverse employment decisionmaking); Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88
Wash. 2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977) (involving tort of outrage including verbal abuse).
75. See Casebeer, Toward a Critical Jurisprudence-A First Step by Way of the Public-
Private Distinction in Constitutional Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 379, 415 (1983). For example,
free speech rights may in the absence of state action be protected under state, but not federal,
constitutional law; see also Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 78 (1980)
(affirming California Supreme Court decision below reported at 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910, 592 P.2d
341, 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979)). See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Pro-
tection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
76. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447
(1982), 42 U.S.C. § 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
77. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (deciding civil rights case on
basis of commerce clause as opposed to an equal protection theory); see also G. STONE, L.
SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1499 (1986) (discussing
1964 Civil Rights Act as largely bypassing the public accommodations racial state action con-
troversy); Quinn, State Action: A Pathology and a Proposed Cure, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 146, 159
(1976) (State action issue limited and less compelling after Civil Rights Act of 1964).
78. See Phillips, supra note 6, at 740 & n.292.
79. Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 508.
80. It should be noted, however, that the filing of a section 1983 action, which requires
that the challenged action have been performed under color of state law, does not allow the
plaintiff to recover in the absence of state action. Under the current case law, the two require-
ments are essentially equivalent. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (closely identify-
ing the two doctrines); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928-32, 935 & n.18 (1982);
Kohn, 457 U.S. at 838; United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966) ("[i]n cases under
§ 1983, 'under color' of law has consistently been treated same as 'state action' required under
Fourteenth Amendment"); L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 18-4, at 1703 n.2.
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ter area,"'" or that, on a dispassionate analysis, state action must always
be present in any litigated case, 2 and this Article has also considered a
number of other misconceptions remediable by focusing more closely on
the concept of responsibility. Further direction for the state action doc-
trine can be drawn from a more detailed examination of the massive
amount of technical literature on the concept of responsibility itself.83
Focusing on the concept of responsibility allows us to resist the temp-
tation to infer case law inconsistency from the existence of close, factu-
ally sensitive opinions, to infer the absence of rules" or clear principles85
from the presumably inconsistent case law, and to infer the eventual de-
mise of the concept of state action from the absence of any such prin-
ciple.8 6 The conclusion that the state action doctrine has lost some
meaning8" or all meaning88 is reinforced by the broader conclusion that
the distinction between public and private in general is becoming increas-
ingly meaningless, 9 or even that "it has no logical content at all."'  For
the broader claim to be true, the skeptic would have to show not merely
that the public-private distinction is manipulable or has historically
shifted, but that in such core cases as a routine death penalty prosecu-
tion, one could plausibly argue that no state action is involved. Critics of
the state action distinction might, with greater justification, aim their
criticism at the often difficult distinction between, for example, proxi-
mate cause and "remote" cause in tort litigation. One can rightly sense,
however, that trying to abolish this controversial distinction in substance
and not merely in name would involve real and substantial losses in the
fairness of tort law adjudication.9" State action doctrine is similarly con-
ceptually messy, but practically necessary.
Some critics have been willing to concede that the public-private dis-
81. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
84. See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 18-1, at 1690.
85. See Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 503-04.
86. See, e.g., Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Action" Limit on the
Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 855, 855 (1966); Williams, supra note 51, at
367.
87. See Schneider, supra note 6, at 1150 n.4 (referring to a range of contemporary opinion).
88. Glennon & Nowak, supra note 14, at 222.
89. See, e.g., Nerken, supra note 4, at 298; Phillips, supra note 6, at 725 & n.213.
90. Freeman & Mensch, The Public-Private Distinction in American Law and Life, 36 BuF-
FALO L. REv. 237, 248 (1987); see id. at 249 ("anything can be described as public or
private").
91. See, W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984) (proximate cause as necessary limitation on
otherwise infinite potential responsibility). For the same considerations under another rubric,
see Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Rational Allocation of Func-
tions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 1, 11.
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tinction is in no worse shape than other familiar legal distinctions only
because the latter, having been "exposed" as being socially created rather
than natural in character,92 are themselves increasingly bankrupt and ar-
bitrary.93 Professor Duncan Kennedy consigns such distinctions as rea-
son-fiat and freedom-coercion to the same declining status as public-
private.94 To the degree that the ability to distinguish intelligently be-
tween reason and fiat, or between freedom and coercion,95 diminishes,
law review articles that suggest that, in the name of freedom and reason,
the courts should abolish the meaningless state action doctrine become
more pointless. This Article shall assume that the state action doctrine is
at least potentially as viable as Professor Kennedy, through his commit-
ment to reasonable law review articles, in practice assumes the reason-fiat
distinction to be.
Turning with some reasonable confidence to the philosophical litera-
ture on responsibility itself, two preliminary hurdles can be cleared eas-
ily. First, one should not be discouraged by the recognition that the
concept of responsibility arises in a variety of contexts and may take on a
variety of meanings. Development of a general theory of responsibility
may be unattainable.96 Seeing how responsibility does or could operate
in the particular context of state action can proceed independently.97
Second, no sound reason exists in the literature leading to the conclusion
that government responsibility is necessarily limitless. It has been argued
that "the government is 'omnipresent' with or without the state action
doctrine; either the government is preventing violations or it is allowing
them to occur."98 In some sense, this may be harmlessly true; but we
should not so quickly infer that the government is responsible without
limits, in view of its claims to territorial sovereignty or to a monopoly of
the legitimate use of force. Just as we normally repudiate99 the exotic
view that private individuals are morally or causally responsible without
92. See Lessard, The Idea of the "Private" A Discussion of State Action Doctrine and Sepa-
rate Sphere Ideology, 10 DALHOUSIE L.J. 107, 107 (1986).
93. See generally Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1354-55 (viewing public-private distinction on a continuum reveals its
flaws).
94. See id. at 1349.
95. For a classic exposition of the view that claims about greater and lesser freedom can be
said to be more and less reasonable, see generally I. BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969)
(arguing for the genuineness and moral importance of "negative" liberty).
96. Cf Sober, Apportioning Causal Responsibility, 85 J. PHIL. 303, 304 (1988) (no such
thing as the way science in general apportions causal responsibility).
97. Cf id. (apportionment of causal responsibility as process specific to particular
sciences).
98. Chemerinsky, More Is Not Less: A Rejoinder to Professor Marshall, 80 Nw. U.L. REv.
571, 572 (1985).
99. See, e.g., J. FISHKIN, THE LIMrrS OF OBLIGATION 3-6 (1982); J. GLOVER, CAUSING
DEATH AND SAVING LIVES 94, 104-05 (1977); Barry, And Who Is My Neighbor?, 88 YALE
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practical limit"°o or beyond heroic bounds,' so may we distinguish
mainstream liberal democracies from the most extreme sort of totalitar-
ian states in terms of their scope of governmental responsibility. In a
system of limited government, some constitutional guarantees limit the
scope of ascription of responsibility to government, even if the govern-
ment might have taken, but did not take, steps to prevent the complained
of private action. 1 2
B. Schemata of the Concept of Responsibility
Writers on the idea of responsibility have schematized the concept in
various ways, depending upon their interests and purposes. One of the
most useful typologies, for example, distinguishes four senses or uses of
the concept. These uses include responsibility for an assigned task, re-
sponsibility in the sense of conscientiousness and reliability, responsibil-
ity in the sense of having been a cause of a particular event, and
responsibility as blameworthiness or culpability. 103 The sense of respon-
sibility involved in the state action cases is closely associated with task
responsibility, through a constitution or a moral theory. The public,
however, generally might assign certain limited tasks, negative and posi-
tive, to a government. The analysis of state action probably partakes to
some degree as well of causal responsibility in at least some cases, as we
shall see below.""° The state action literature also promotes the concept
of the government's deserving a measure of blame,0 5 but such blame-
worthiness does not result in legal, as opposed to moral, culpability for
the state, as opposed to the private actor, in the state action context.1°6
Other writers, including H.L.A. Hart,"0 7 Graham Haydon, °8 and
L.J. 629, 653-54 (1979) (discussing proposed limits on the scope of personal responsibility).
But cf J. FISKIN, supra, at 24 (discussing possible higher standard for public officials).
100. Jonathan Glover quotes Father Zossima's report, in The Brothers Karamazov, of his
younger brother's admirable view that "everyone is really responsible for everyone and every-
thing." J. GLOVER, supra note 99, at 104.
101. See Singer, Famine, Affluence and Morality, in Philosophy, Politics and Society 21-35
(5th series) (P. Laslett & J. Fishkin eds. 1979) (adopting a relatively broad, stringent view of
the bounds of personal moral reponsibility).
102. As we shall see below, the possibility of ascribing responsibility based on a failure to
act or an omission, in certain cases, does not imply responsibility for everything in some sense
within one's powers that was not done. See J. GLOVER, supra note 99, at 95.
103. See Flores & Johnson, Collective Responsibility and Professional Roles, 93 ETHICS 537,
538 (1983).
104. See infra notes 112, 113, 115 and accompanying text.
105. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (government "ab-
dication" of responsibilities in failing to censure racial discrimination).
106. Flores and Johnson rightly recognize that "[t]o say that a person bears responsibility
does not necessarily imply that he should be punished." Flores & Johnson, supra note 103, at
539.
107. See Hart, Varieties of Responsibility, 83 L.Q. REv. 346, 346 (1967) (distinguishing role,
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Tony Honore, 1° have devised or relied upon somewhat similar sche-
mata. Each schema itself will unavoidably tend to involve some internal
overlap. For example, while some possibility exists of assigning responsi-
bility without blame, a person or government might well be morally
blamed, incurring one kind of responsibility, for failing, or failing inex-
cusably, to fulfill an assigned task, which is a separate sort of responsibil-
ity. 110 Failure to fulfill an assigned task or role"' may incur
responsibility in a way that overlaps as well with responsibility for the"consequences or results or upshots""' 2 of one's actions. 13 This concep-
tual pluralism and conceptual overlap, however, does not necessarily im-
ply conceptual confusion.
It should be pointed out that task responsibility, which has occasion-
ally been singled out in the philosophical literature,' 1 4 is not an inher-
ently restrictive, positivistic, or conservative notion. Much of nineteenth
and twentieth century American public policy debate can be cast in
terms of disputes as to the proper bounds or limits of governmental task
responsibility. Serving as a "night-watchman" is one conception of
proper governmental task responsibility, but radical egalitarianism, or
eradication of all vestiges of discrimination, are also conceivable govern-
mental tasks. It is no objection that these latter, more demanding tasks
cannot possibly be fulfilled in their entirety by any familiar sort of gov-
ernment. Some task responsibilities cannot, by their very nature, be fully
and completely discharged." 5 If task responsibility must relate to tasks
actually dischargeable by a government with limited resources, room still
exists for a broad, progressive legal doctrine of state action. The govern-
ment cannot, on such an approach, be deemed responsible for failing to
prevent, for example, each and every act of private discrimination. I6 Its
causal, liability, and capacity responsibility); see also Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk,
Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof- Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts,
73 IowA L. REV. 1001, 1012 (1988) (distinguishing legal liability-responsibility from causal
responsibility).
108. See Haydon, On Being Responsible, 28 PHIL. Q. 46, 46-47 (1978) (distinguishing virtue,
capacity, liability, and causal responsibility).
109. See Honore, Responsibility and Luck, 104 L.Q. REV. 530, 531 (1988) (focusing in par-
ticular on "outcome responsibility").
110. See, H. PITCHER & T. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 63 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing
responsibility in the absence of blameworthiness); Hart, supra note 107, at 349.
111. See generally Hart, supra note 107.
112. Pitcher, Hart on Action and Responsibility, 69 PHIL. REV. 226, 227 (1960).
113. Pitcher distinguishes task responsibility from responsibility for consequences. Id. at
227.
114. See, e.g., Goodin, Apportioning Responsibilities, 6 L. & PHIL. 167 (1985); Goodin, Re-
sponsibilities, 36 PHIL. Q. 50, 50 n.1 (1986).
115. Goodin, Responsibilities, 36 PHIL. Q. 50, 54 (1986).
116. The concept of responsibility itself does not require, though, that the person have been
in a position to control or prevent the event in question, at least at the time of the event. This
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task responsibility, however, may still require the state to exert reason-
able or best efforts to prevent such discrimination, or at least to avoid
profiting from or legitimizing such private discrimination.1" 7
C. Additional Factors Affecting Responsibility
What allows us to find responsibility in the relevant sense will often be
unavoidably complex, but the process is not utterly unstructured and
open. Admittedly, the process requires judgment. Professor Joel Fein-
berg has rightly observed that "legal responsibility in problematic cases is
relative to a variety of conflicting interests, purposes, and policies and
cannot simply be 'read off' the facts." '118 In the easy state action cases,
the courts can readily find state action on the basis of the relative explan-
atory richness of the state's involvement.1 19 In the closer cases, a pattern
of typical considerations emerges.
One such consideration is the seriousness of the substantive moral evil
complained of in the case. It is often suggested quite falsely that when
courts appear to consider the gravity of the harm alleged when deciding a
state action issue, they must be illegitimately and unjustifiably "peeking"
ahead at the constitutional merits of the case. 120 This need not be so. As
a matter of moral common sense, the scope of responsibility of a person
or a state tends to expand or contract with the degree of seriousness of
is especially so if the person being held responsible had deliberately "disabled" himself from
being able to control the event in question. See Zimmerman, Negligence and Moral Responsi-
bility, 20 Nous 199, 205 (1986) (discussing this possibility).
117. See generally Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961) (noting
the possibility of state benefit from or symbiosis with the alleged discrimination).
118. J. FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 26-27 (1970) (emphasis in the original); see also
id. at 141 (discussing relativity of ascriptions of responsibility to context, values, policies, rules,
and practices).
119. Cf D. BRAINE, THE REALITY OF TIME AND THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 272 (1988)
(responsibility of a billiard player is attributable to greater "richness" of his actions in account-
ing for the positions of billiard balls). The explanatory richness of one actor's contribution to
an event may reflect the unusual, abnormal, or extraordinary character of that actor's action or
inaction. See D. EMMETT, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CAUSES 59 (1985); J. FEINBERG, supra
note 118, at 143; Stapleton, Law, Causation and Common Sense, 8 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
111, 114, 117 (1988). The "explanatory richness" of a cause is, however, at least in the state
action context, also a function of, at a minimum, the desirability of what the state has done or
has omitted. See Sunstein, supra note 56, at 887. The state ultimately cannot evade responsi-
bility on the grounds that its behavior was common, expected, or traditional. The state's re-
sponsibility for private racial discrimination, for example, does not become insignificant merely
because the state's role may be historically unchanging, or even broadly popular.
120. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 540; Glennon & Nowak, supra note 14, at 224
("traditional theory of state action both the value of the challenged practice and the nature of
the complainant's asserted rights are irrelevant"); Phillips, supra note 6, at 742; Rowe, supra
note 6, at 769; cf Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 373-74 (1974) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) ("[t]he Court has not adopted the notion, accepted elsewhere, that different
standards should apply to state-action analysis when different constitutional claims are
presented").
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the harm that action might prevent. We are more properly called to
account for failing to give up an hour's sleep in order to save a life than
to cure a painful hangnail. Thus, the common suggestion that the courts
do or should find state action more readily in racial discrimination than
in non-racial benefit termination cases, for example, need not reflect judi-
cial subterfuge, but rather the very logic of the concept of responsibility
itself. 12
Some considerations affecting personal responsibility do require trans-
lation into the governmental sphere. For example, on most common
moral theories, the physical distance between the potential rescuer and
the rescuee, the latter's accessibility, or the fact that some sort of geo-
graphical or jurisdictional boundary would have to be crossed, may make
a direct or indirect difference in the potential rescuer's scope of responsi-
bility. This may reflect nothing more than the cost of the rescue, or the
degree of knowledge as to how to effect the rescue or whether a rescue is
even appropriate. 22 Government responsibility looks to similar consid-
erations, but a geographical boundary often either does not affect,' 23 or
decisively limits, government responsibility. 124 In addition, we may
count costs a bit differently in the case of government. The direct finan-
cial costs of imposing responsibility on the government for performing a
certain task is certainly important, but the indirect costs in terms of in-
creased governmental intrusion, loss of privacy, and the potential for
governmental abuse and aggrandizement are also important, 125 or at
least more important than is often the case when assigning responsibility
to private individuals.
Whether a person should be considered responsible for an outcome
often reflects, as well, the element of intent.'26 Again, there must be
some translation of this element into the realm of state action. Govern-
ments may be found not responsible for a private act for such reasons as
blameless ignorance or incapability of affecting the event that is being
constitutionally challenged. However, a government, unlike a private in-
dividual, cannot generally evade responsibility on grounds that it was
121. See, e.g., Davis, The Supreme Court: Finding State Action... Sometimes, 26 How.
L.J. 1395, 1422-23 (1983); Friendly, supra note 6, at 1291; Schneider, supra note 54, at 742;
Note, supra note 63, at 657. But cf Rotunda, Runyon v. McCrary and the Mosaic of State
Action, 67 WASH. U.L.Q. 47, 56-57 (1989) (expressing doubt as to the Court's greater willing-
ness to find state action in racial discrimination cases).
122. See, e.g., J. FISHKIN, supra note 99, at 72-74; Barry, supra note 99, at 652-54.
123. Presumably, the federal government cannot cite a state boundary line as grounds for
diminishing its own responsibility as a non-resident individual might.
124. Generally, the federal or state government's constitutionally-based responsibility
would stop abruptly at the national border, however morally arbitrary this may seem.
125. See generally Marshall, Diluting Constitutional Rights: Rethinking "Rethinking State
Action", 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 558 (1985).
126. See Zimmerman, Sharing Responsibility, 22 AM. PHIL. Q. 115, 115 (1985).
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subject to duress, coercion, or undue influence. The motive"' or in-
tent1 28 underlying a government act or omission is sometimes nonethe-
less of constitutional relevance.
The extent to which the government's lack of intent that the chal-
lenged event occur actually absolves the state of responsibility may some-
times be unclear. Some scholars have noted that persons can be called to
account for consequences beyond those that they intended.12 9 These
would include events that were foreseen but not intended, 30 as well as
events that occurred by virtue of the mere negligence of the party sought
to be held responsible.' 3' Some of the cases in which courts have found
state action are best explained on the basis of the government's negli-
gence, rather than on any governmental intent to underwrite or endorse
the particular complained of evil. 132 The case law makes clear, however,
that the government's foresight of a particular adverse consequence of its
own action is not invariably sufficient under all circumstances to render
the state responsible for that consequence. 33 As a general rule, the gov-
ernment may be responsible for consequences it had foreseen, but did not
intend, in proportion to the clarity and degree of moral objectionability
of the underlying private act which it gave effect to or acquiesced in, in
addition to other considerations bearing on governmental responsibility
discussed above.
Courts will inevitably find some cases to be close to the boundary line
between the state's being responsible and not being responsible, wherever
that boundary line is drawn. Some state action cases will be difficult to
resolve after all of the relevant considerations have been assigned their
127. See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 1700 & n.6; Halberstam, Trying and Responsibility, 28
TULANE STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY: STUDIES IN ACTION THEORY 124 (R. Whittemore ed.
1979).
128. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
129. See Miller, supra note 12, at 75 (discussing the views of the philosopher Anthony
Kenny).
130. See Baldwin, supra note 12, at 352-53. Butcf. id. at 355 (a person may not be responsi-
ble for all foreseen consequences of his actions); see also Kagan, supra note 12, at 301 (moral
implications of distinction between intending and foreseeing not entirely clear).
131. See generally Zimmerman, Negligence and Moral Responsibility, 20 Nous 199 (1986).
132. For instance, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) would seem to
involve governmental negligence or inadvertence rather than a specific intent on the part of the
state to endorse or support private racial discrimination.
133. Consider a case in which a state knowingly admits to probate a will which, on its face,
provides for a bequest to A rather than B solely on grounds of the testator's expressly avowed
racial bigotry. Regardless of the merits of B's due process claim, there is good reason for
finding state action in the case, despite the state's lack of intent to discriminate. This would be
partly in view of the inescapable moral gravity of the underlying act, to which the government
appears to consciously acquiesce, and to which it now gives legal effect. See Henkin, supra
note 9, at 499-500. The state may incur responsibility in such a case even if, as a general
matter, it consistently condemns and penalizes racial discrimination in other contexts, and
even if it had no practical means available to prevent the will's being drafted in such a fashion.
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proper weight. In such cases, the courts may still be in a position to
reasonably decide the state action issue. One useful technique would be
for the court to examine the conduct, at all relevant times, of both the
party asserting the existence of state action, and the party denying that
state action is present. The court could inquire whether either party had,
but failed to avail itself of, a practical, low-cost opportunity, at the rele-
vant time, to make the state action issue easier to adjudicate. Specifi-
cally, the court might ask whether the plaintiff could have easily tied the
state more clearly to the defendant's challenged act. The court might
also ask whether the defendant did all that it easily could have done to
distance or dissociate itself from the state, with respect to the challenged
conduct. 134
D. Some Remaining Problems
One of the most important unresolved problems in the area of state
action concerns the status of state omissions. This is occasionally
phrased in terms of whether the state can "act by failing to act." 3 ' This
particular formulation is phrased misleadingly for several reasons. First,
it may be proper to distinguish the state's mere inaction from a "failure"
to act. There is no reason to believe that non-acting, omitting, refraining,
and failing to act are all related to responsibility in the same manner.1 36
It should also be noted that the constitutional text does not speak in
terms of state action or inaction, but rather in terms of denying, depriv-
ing, and so forth. 137
Too often, the courts become mesmerized by the distinction between
acting and failing to act. The Court in Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 3 '
for example, reached the finding of no state action by pointing out that
"the crux of respondents' complaint is not that the state has acted, but
that it has refused to act."' 39 The Court's assumption that a state's re-
fusal to act cannot constitute "state action" is reinforced by the Court's
focus on "conduct,"" which seems to refer most directly to positive ac-
tion. In another context, the Court has suggested that "when an agency
refuses to act it generally does not exercise its coercive power over an
individual's liberty or property rights, and thus does not infringe upon
134. For the fuller development of a similar mechanism of resolving close cases in another
context, see Wright, Speech On Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37 DE PAUL L. REV.
27 (1987).
135. Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (1960).
136. See, e.g., Gorr, Omissions, 28 TULANE STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY: STUDIES IN ACTION
THEORY 93 (R. Whittemore ed. 1979); Weinryb, supra note 12, at 1.
137. This distinction is noted in Black, supra note 3, at 73.
138. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
139. Id. at 166 (emphasis in the original).
140. Lugar v. Edmundson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982).
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areas that courts often are called upon to protect."' 141
The Court's analysis, in this respect, is completely unsatisfactory. As
an extreme, but clear, example, consider the case of a government's sys-
tematic, malicious refusal to provide any police protection for specified
residential neighborhoods. Whether the government is seeking to coerce
the residents in some way is irrelevant. Plainly, the government's failure
and refusal to act, or to provide any police protection, may deny the
affected residents the equal protection of the laws. This result flows from
a literal reading of the fourteenth amendment. Upon analysis, the gov-
ernment might well bear responsibility in such a case for some related
injurious private acts. As the Court itself has observed, "no state may
effectively abdicate its responsibilities by either ignoring them or by
merely failing to discharge them whatever the motive may be." 142
One might object, however, that even if a government may incur re-
sponsibility by failing to act, the conceptual problems do not end. Con-
sider a case involving the fully competent private actor, who, we shall
assume, is under no compulsion or duress and who carefully and deliber-
ately considered the challenged conduct. Surely this is a case in which
we might want to hold the private actor "fully" responsible for his own
actions. In such a case, is there any responsibility "left over" for the
government to bear? Relying on a strong version of what has been called
"ethical dilutionism,"' 143 one may argue that in these cases some fixed
amount of responsibility exists for the challenged practice, that this re-
sponsibility "is like a pie to be divided,"'' l and that the private actor's
full responsibility means that there can be no responsibility left ovr for
the government.
It is true that people often behave as if responsibility were ordinarily
diluted by being shared, or that one person's being "fully" responsible
means that others cannot share in the responsibility. 14 The predominant
141. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (emphasis in the original). But cf id. at
838 (apparently holding open the possibility that government's failure to act might in some
cases violate individual constitutional rights).
142. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961). See Black, supra note
3, at 73 (discussing "denial" of protection through inaction); Zimmerman, Sharing Responsi-
bility, 22 AM. PHIL. Q. 115, 118 (1985)("one can be morally responsible to some extent for the
outcome of an omission"). None of this is to deny that there may be morally relevant distinc-
tions between acts and omissions. See Baldwin, supra note 12, at 355.
143. See Mellema, On Being Fully Responsible, 21 AM PHIL. Q. 189, 190 (1984) (discussing
view that responsibility is fixed in total amount, regardless of its allocability among greater or
fewer numbers of potentially responsible actors).
144. Id
145. See generally Latane & Darley, Social Determinants of Bystander Intervention in Emer-
gencies, ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR 13-27 (J. Macauley & L. Berkowitz eds. 1970);
Mellema, Shared Responsibility and Ethical Dilutionism, 63 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 177, 177
(1985).
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view among philosophers, however, is that "moral responsibility ... is
not a fixed-sum game."' 46 As one writer commenting on responsibility
in government states, "[t]here is no fixed pool of responsibility such that
when one person's share goes up, another's must go down." '147 A theory
of state action based on state responsibility need not go so far as to pre-
tend that the state is as responsible as it would have been if the govern-
ment itself had played all of the roles in the challenged action. 14 But the
government may in a proper case, be said to be fully responsible for that
particular outcome even though the government is not solely responsible
for that outcome. 149
In an extreme case, it is even possible to imagine finding that the gov-
ernment in some sense bears a greater responsibility for producing an
outcome in cooperation with a private actor than if the government had
produced the same outcome alone. This possibility exists because re-
sponsibility is not solely a matter of causation,' 50 but of morality as well.
It may be that in the first case the very clarity and vividness of the coop-
erating private actor's moral depravity should serve to bring home to the
state the moral hideousness of the role that the state itself is undertaking.
Were it not for the presence of a negative moral example in the private
146. Barry, supra note 99, at 650.
147. Thompson, Ascribing Responsibility to Advisers in Government, 93 ETHICS 546, 554
(1983). See generally Zimmerman, supra note 141 (rejecting ethical dilutionism).
148. See Mellema, supra note 145, at 183.
149. See Zimmerman, Intervening Agents and Moral Responsibility, 35 PHIL. Q. 347, 355
(1985).
150. The relationship between causation and responsibility, in general, is controversial.
Scholars have often suggested, perhaps misleadingly, that legal responsibility or more accu-
rately, legal liability, does not require a showing of causation. See, e.g., Stapleton, supra note
119, at 129; Thompson, Remarks on Causation and Liability, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 101, 101
(1984). Some writers have suggested that moral responsibility is not invariably dependent
upon causation. See, e.g., D'Amato, The "Bad Samaritan" Paradigm, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 798,
808-09 (1975); Mack, Bad Samaritanism and the Causation of Harm, 9 PHIL. & PuB. AFF.
230, 233-35 (1980). Others have suggested that responsibility in at least some sense generally
requires a showing of causation. See, e.g., Green, Refraining and Responsibility, in 28 TULANE
STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY: STUDIES IN ACTION THEORY 108 (R. Whittemore ed. 1979);
Thompson, supra note 147, at 547 (reporting a commonly held view); Weinryb, supra note 12,
at 2-3; Zimmerman, supra note 131, at 120.
In contexts where causation is necessary for responsibility, it is controversial whether an
omission can be said to make a causal contribution to an event. See, e.g., Gorr, supra note 136,
at 101; Green, supra, at 110-11; Husak, supra note 12, at 320-21. In the state action context,
much of this controversy can be bypassed. In a case in which, for example, the government
willfully fails to keep its promise, thereby failing to do something, the government may clearly
bear responsibility for some of the ensuing challenged private party acts or their consequences,
whether or not we choose to adopt the language of causation. Additionally, the government's
unexpected ratification of a private act may bring a share of responsibility upon the govern-
ment for that prior act, even though the government's ratification cannot flow backwards in
time to cause the ratified private act.
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actor, we might be less inclined to impute responsibility to the state for
certain consequences of the state's own actions.
V. CONCLUSION
The clear consensus among observers is that the concept of state action
is either inherently meaningless or irremediably confused. It is often sug-
gested that state action will inevitably be present in any litigated case.
Courts occasionally encourage these severe judgments, as when they
falsely assert that a state's failure to act cannot constitute "state action,"
or when the courts give the appearance of illegitimately considering the
constitutional merits in deciding the state action issue, without explain-
ing the relation between the gravity of the harm at issue and the presence
or absence of state action. Regardless, the consensus is mistaken.
This Article has taken up the courts' own use of the idea of responsi-
bility in the state action context, and has attempted to bring some of the
enormous philosophical literature on the concept of responsibility to bear
on an analysis of state action. As it turns out, while the general result of
attending to the philosophical literature above has been to liberalize or
broaden the range of circumstances in which state action can be found,
this may reflect the problems selected for discussion. It certainly is not
inevitable that the doctrine of state action be broad and inclusive. This
Article suggests, however, that if we adopt a narrow, restrictive doctrine
of state action, we must do so only in connection with narrowing and
restricting of the range of circumstances, actions, and events for which
we consider our government responsible.
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